Professional Skipper Issue 33


EDITORIAL Marine reserves to push 12-mile limit As we go to press today, March 28, the Department of Conservation has announced the Mother of all marine reserves proposal for Great Barrier Island in the Hauraki Gulf. The area covers some 52,772 hectares, or 136 square nautical miles out to the 12-mile limit, making it the largest proposal close to the New Zealand mainland. New Zealand's largest marine reserve is located at the Kermadec Islands, and covers some 735,000 hectares. The proposed marine reserve for the Auckland Islands I understand will be about half the size of the Kermadecs. But it's the Great Barrier proposal that is of significant concern, and one that has the potential to set a far-reaching precedence for coastal reserves out to the 12-mile limit. What DoC hasn't mentioned is that the reserve's southern boundary is adjacent to the northern boundary of the Royal New Zealand Navy testing area, which excludes anchoring and fishing over some 42 square nautical miles. By default the defence area adds an additional buffer, extending the reserve to some 178 square nautical miles, removing over a quarter of the coastline of Great Barrier from public recreational and commercial fishing. I have to ask why? Where is the risk and what is the threat to the marine biodiversity in this region? The area is a prime recreational sportfishing region that, while protected by its isolation, gives Auckland boaties access to the migratory species of tuna and marlin whilst sheltered from our predominant sou'westerly winds. When asked why so large, the community relations manager of the Auckland conservancy, Warwick Murray, said it was part of meeting the government's objective of placing 10 percent of our coastline into reserves. Great Barrier Island's area manager, Dale Tawa, said that a benefit of this reserve is to provide a safe haven for several species of marine animals presently impacted by fishing, such as snapper, crayfish and paua, to allow them to recover to their natural population density. Now hold on a minute! Marine reserves are not a fisheries management tool. We have the Fisheries Act for that. I also understand that DoC has been in discussion with local iwi for some time about the proposal. the local Hapu are against, but if forced would want to retain their customary rights to harvest seafood and shellfish in the area once it is designated as a marine reserve. Clearly this is not allowed under the current Marine Reserves Act. Is this an insight into a last-minute change we may see to the Marine Reserves Bill which is currently before the Select Committee to allow customary take from within a marine reserve? I would hope not. Tawa says the reserve will provide the first opportunity to protect deepwater, rocky and sedimentary habitats on the continental shelf. Other warm waters from the East Auckland current bring a sub-tropical influence to the marine life found there and increases its biological diversity. "It is a great opportunity," he said, "for people to enjoy a high quality marine environment for recreation and scientific study." Isn't this the reason why the Poor Knights in total was declared a marine reserve? And now we need more? I am becoming increasingly concerned about the ad hoc manner in which marine reserves are being notified and applied for. The Department of Conservation has no management control on reserve applications. It's no wonder that both amateur and commercial fishers react negatively when confronted with a constant stream of proposals around our coastline. Tawa said that most of the proposed marine reserve's land boundary is publicly owned conservation land, and would create a protective corridor from the mountaintops to the 12-mile limit, something that has yet to be achieved in New Zealand. Murray advises that this reserve will be notified under the current act, and anyone wanting a copy of the discussion document and questionnaire should contact the Department of Conservation Auckland conservancy or the Great Barrier Island area office. The return date for questionnaires is June 30, or download from www.doc.govt.nz/pdfs/auckland/great-barrier-is-marine-res-proposal.pdf If you feel that this proposal will further erode your access rights to go fishing, then I believe it is important that you contact your representative organisation and personally respond to the questionnaire. The Department of Conservation has an unfortunate history of not consulting transparently with the public. My hope is that on this occasion they have learnt from other reserve proposals, such as the Volkners, Wellington's south coast and Pirininihi in north Taranaki. Keith Ingram, Editor	To Top
Coastal Characters The Glyn Bird is a survivor by Baden Pascoe Little is known about the Glyn Bird's history before 1919. It is known that Ernie Lane built her in Picton in 1911, and that when she was launched she was given the name Betsey Baird. Whom she was built for remains a mystery. She must have steamed from Picton early in her life, as I have located a reference to her in a Motor Boat & Yachting magazine dated May 20, 1916, when she was on an Auckland slip for repairs to her rudder post and the fitting of a new stern tube. In that publication she was described as being a trawler. In 1919 she was sold to the Parry family of the Pukapuka Inlet on Mahurangi Harbour, who used her as a cream launch and coastal trader to deliver their produce from their small dairy factory. They renamed her the Glyn Bird to give her a closer association with the name of their dairy factory, The Glyn Dairy Company. Glyn was also a part of their family name. Records show that she was powered by a 40hp Union Oil petrol engine. I would imagine that she also carried a small rig and a set of sails to assist her. Two mast steps remain in her keelson as evidence that she was ketch or schooner-rigged. Llewelyn Parry used her extensively in Auckland, and put her to work at whatever he could find. In 1920 he won a contract with the Auckland Harbour Board to remove rubbish from ships and dispose of it further out in the Hauraki Gulf. She was simply known as 'the Gut Boat'. In 1933 she was officially sold to the newly formed coastal shipping company Parry Bros Ltd. (see the articles on the Parry Bros in issues 27 and 28 of Professional Skipper.) During the time they owned her they must have re-engined her, as records dated 1936 show she was powered by a 25hp Ailsa Craig diesel. With such low power I would imagine that the rig and sails were used as well on occasions. Jack Taylor told me that when he began his apprenticeship in 1936 as a boatbuilder with Lidgards that she laid derelict in a yard next door. He can vividly recall the state she was in and was amused by the garden growing on her deck. She must have lain idle for some time before that to get in such a state. She was put back on an even keel and side-slipped to Lidgard's yard to be repaired to a survey standard shortly afterwards. Frank Eaddy had just started his apprenticeship with Lidgards in 1938, and can recall some of the work carried out to bring her back into shape. Deck repairs were done (he thinks they could have totally replaced the decking), new hatches and stronger bollards fitted, and she may have had a superstructure added to make her more suitable as a coastal motor tug. Frank can remember the hatch work well, as one of the covers was propped up with a short piece of wood which slipped out, resulting in broken bones in his hand. All the work was carried out as 'fill in' jobs between bigger assignments. According to Frank, the work was completed over a period of four to five years. The boat must have gone back into the water some time in the early 1940s, and Frank recalls being complimented on his caulking skills. The boat didn't leak a drop, which is surprising, as some of the seams were 5/8in wide! The diagonals acted as a backing for the oakum. Later she had a four-cylinder Kelvin K88hp fitted. The date of this installation is not currently known. However, I do know that her present 8L3 Gardner was fitted in 1954. Keith Penney clearly recalls lowering the engine into the hull on an unusual angle so that it fitted under one of the deck beams en route to its final resting place. Joe Allely completed all the engineering work. The Glyn Bird, with her single engine, was seldom used on the northern run to Parengarenga. Her regular run was down to Wharekawa on the shingle run. Her regular tows were the wooden barge Ellis M, and later the 100 tonne barge Wakakeri. She ran night and day while the Auckland Harbour Bridge was being built, as the Wharekawa aggregate was found to be the most effective for all the concrete work throughout the construction. In her Parry days her first skippers were obviously the Parry Bros, Ivor, Harry, Llewelyn and Norman. George and Jimmy Webb took the helm later on. After them came Nip Lowe, who held the position for many years. Nip's long service ensures that his name will always be a part of the Glyn Bird's heritage. Looking at the Glyn Bird's frames, planking and inner structure, she has certainly been through the 'school of hard knocks'. Many of her original sawn frames are sistered (doubled up), and in some places on her quarters there are sister frames on both sides of the original frames. Some time during the 1950s to early 1960s she fell over in her cradle while being launched after one of her annual maintenance and survey sessions, and a cradle arm punched through her port side. Keith Penney was on board at the time, and was standing in the engine room hatch waiting to kick the 8L3 into life. He recalls the splintering and crunching noises, and the short time lapse it took him to figure out what had happened. However, she was repaired within a few days, and was back in the water ready to start her ever-busy schedule for the forthcoming year. Towards the end of her life as a tug she was fitted with the superstructure she has today. This was necessary to create more cabin space to conform to new regulations, and give the skipper greater visibility when working the newer barges in an 'alongside' manoeuvring position. Her crews all speak well of her seakindliness and the way she rides in a big sea. I would think that Ernie designed her for South Island conditions, and her narrow, deep draft would have played an important part in achieving this characteristic. It definitely gave her a good bite in the water, and made her one of the better tugs around the harbour. When Parry's started to modernise their fleet, the Glyn Bird was sold. The next owner is unknown to me, but Geoff Mather took her over and used her as a diving tender for his deep-sea diving school. He also did the occasional towing job with her, and her log has an entry recording a return run to Picton. In 1992 she was on the market again, and she caught the eye of Grant and Lee Barry. They soon fell in love with her solid, classical looks and purchased her. They went to work and cleaned her up at their Herald Island property, and have enjoyed years of fun cruising the Hauraki Gulf with their two children. Over the years she has become part of the family. Their children have grown up and are now 'doing their own thing', so the Glyn Bird is now too big for them. She is once again on the market and they are looking for a good home for her. After meeting Grant and Lee Barry, I have the distinct impression that their choice of a new and good home for the Glyn Bird will be chosen with the greatest of care. They totally understand the significant heritage that this boat carries, and would like to see this preserved for years to come. Note: In the previous issue of Coastal Characters on the Eva, the record time for the return trip to Whakatane was 52 hours, not 72 hours.	To Top
New vessel joins Whale Watch fleet by Aaron Joyes The small township of Kaikoura on the north-eastern tip of the South Island has seen another whale-watching vessel enter service. The 17.7m vessel has the Maori name of Aoraki, meaning cloud piercer. "The performance of the vessel is outstanding, especially considering our local conditions," says Marcus Solomon, the General Manager of Operations for Whale Watch Kaikoura Ltd. "We operate in big, constant, demanding swells, and then in the afternoon we usually get a 25 knot 1m to 2m chop come up." When Whale Watch first started out on their ship programme, they went into the international market to try to find the most suitable design that could be used to standardise their fleet, said Solomon. After extensive research, including a couple of trips to Australia, Solomon found the designer, Nic de Waal of Teknicraft Design, at his own back door. After demonstrating the research and development that he had undertaken, initially in South Africa and then more extensively in New Zealand, de Waal sold Whale Watch Kaikoura on his design. There is always an element of risk for the vessel owner when building a vessel to a revolutionary design, says Solomon. "we are really pleased with the vessel, and we believe that this design must be up there with the best in the world for a vessel of this size." Built by Q-West in Wanganui, Aoraki has a beam of 6.4m, a draft of 70cm and a displacement of 28 tonnes. Twin MTU 8V2000 M70 diesel engines rated at 525kW @ 2100rpm drive a pair of 391 Hamilton Jet units offering a maximum speed of 32 knots and a cruising speed of 28 knots. The superstructure coating was supplied by Altex Coatings and applied by Universal Enterprises in Whangarei. Maxwell VW2200 24 volt winches were selected, and Advance Trident supplied an electronics package primarily of Simrad equipment. The Aoraki has an educational entertainment system on board consisting of a plasma flat television screen, a VCR, a CD player and a computer. This audiovisual system is used to give presentations to the passengers during excursions. A Cruisair air-conditioning unit helps maximise passenger comfort. "The Aoraki is designed really well," says Solomon. "The hydra-foil system keeps the ride comfortable and gives us massive savings on fuel, offering us better economy for operating the service." Whale Watch was formed in 1987. Securing a loan to buy the first whale-watching vessel was difficult, said Solomon. After being turned away by mainstream banks, local Ngati Kuri, many of them unemployed, pledged their meagre assets to secure a commercial loan from an indigenous peoples' bank. The whale-watching operation proved successful, and a second vessel was bought in 1989. To expand, local Ngati Kuri went to their tribal authority, the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board, with a proposition to borrow money. The board agreed, and also bought a major shareholding in the expanding company. Whale Watch is now entirely funded by income and tribal finance, and is still growing steadily. In 1995, 40,000 people, 90 percent of whom were from outside New Zealand, took part in the whale watch experience. "Q-West build an excellent vessel," says Solomon. "I have a good relationship with them and they work hard to meet our needs. We required them to customise certain aspects of our vessel, and they were more than happy to accommodate and work with us. The vessel is outstanding." Q-West and Teknicraft Design also teamed up to deliver a 12.6m passenger ferry to an Auckland operator in early December. See www.q-west.com	To Top
TRANSPORT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION COMMISSION ACT 1990 The principal purpose of the Transport Accident Investigation Commission shall be to determine the circumstances and causes of accidents and incidents, with a view to avoiding similar occurrences in the future, rather than to ascribe blame to any person. Crews had poor watchkeeping skills On November 16, 2001, at about 0445 hours, the yacht Toolka-T fouled the towline between the tug Wainui and the barge Sea-Tow II. The yacht was carried along the towline until she collided with the bow of the barge. She passed under the barge and sank as a result of the collision. The owner of the yacht was unable to get clear and did not survive the accident, which occurred off Takatu Point, north of Auckland. Following its investigation, the Transport Accident Investigation Authority recommended that the Director of Maritime Safety continue to monitor the compulsory boating safety education programmes introduced into Canada and other jurisdiction until December 2004 with a view to implementing a similar programme in New Zealand. The TAIC also recommended that he critically review the need to ensure that all bridge watchkeepers on New Zealand-registered vessels are appropriately qualified. The 11.28m Toolka-T had left Opua for Gulf Harbour on November 15, having arrived from Vanuatu the day before and cleared Customs and Immigration. The GRP yacht, which was built in Australia in 1979, was based at Gulf Harbour and was crewed by the owner, his partner ('the watchkeeper') and two friends. They were returning home after spending about four months cruising in the Pacific. All those on board were experienced sailors but had no formal qualifications. The watchkeeper normally wore glasses, but had broken them. The trip down the coast was uneventful, and the owner handed the watch over to the watchkeeper at 0200 hours on November 16, when the yacht was about eight miles north of Cape Rodney. The Toolka-T was on autopilot and on a course of about 151 degrees magnetic. At about 0425 hours the watchkeeper noticed a 'brightly lit' vessel, the Wainui, ahead and about four miles away, and presumed that it was closing on a more or less reciprocal course. The tug was showing bright white lights and a green starboard sidelight, and she thought it was a fishing vessel. In order to pass port-to-port, she initially altered course by five degrees to starboard, then a further 20 degrees, before changing course again in order to pass starboard-to-starboard. At this stage she said the vessels were about half a mile apart. After passing the Wainui, she altered course back to her original heading of 151 degrees magnetic. Within a very short time she became aware of the towline but could not avoid hitting it. She warned her companions and tried turning the wheel to port, but the yacht's keel fouled the 500m-tow line, which was partially submerged. She could now see the green and red sidelights of the barge and its bow bearing down on the yacht. One of the two friends arrived in the cockpit, disengaged the autopilot and also tried to turn the helm to port. 'But a collision was imminent and inevitable,' said the commission. Meanwhile, the 16.5m tug Wainui, with her master and four crew on board, had left Auckland with the 40.7m, 1500 tonne Sea-Tow II in tow just after midnight on November 16. They were bound for Pakiri Beach. The towline was 500m long and was made of 56mm multiplait rope. The distance between the stern of the tug and the bow of the barge was 559m, being the towline, the barge pennant and the barge bridle. The master estimated the towline would have been submerged by about 1m at its mid-length. The master had worked for the operator since 1974, and had two professional qualifications. The first deckhand had no qualifications, the second stated that he had an Australian certificate. After passing Takatu Point, the first deckhand was about to end his watch. He handed over to the second deckhand at 0440 hours but did not tell him he had seen a light on the starboard bow. On taking command, the second deckhand saw a vessel and thought it would pass down the starboard side of the tug, but could not accurately judge its heading. He altered course slightly to port to give the vessel more sea room. The deckhand watched the yacht pass by and then alter course to pass between the tug and the barge. He then realised the other vessel was a yacht, the Toolka-T. The yacht stopped and moved aft until it collided with the bow of the Sea-Tow II. He saw lots of sparks and tried unsuccessfully to pull back the engine throttles. The yacht was dragged a short way wedged under the bow before being dragged underneath the barge. The change in the engine tone alerted the skipper. But he was woken by the deckhand. The watchkeeper and her two friends on board were able to get clear and cling to a floating fender. They saw the Wainui turn back and called for help each time the searchlight passed near them. They also called out for the owner but got no response. The survivors were taken aboard the Wainui and given showers and dry clothing. The Royal New Zealand Navy vessel Resolution located the wreck of the Toolka-T at 0810 hours. Analysis In analysing the accident, the TAIC said that the watchkeeper and the crew on Wainui had inadequate watchkeeping skills. With a close-quarter situation developing during a change of watch, it would have been good practice for the first deckhand to remain in charge until the situation was resolved. Neither deckhand appreciated the importance of what was happening, nor did they establish what type of vessel the Toolka-T was or how far off the yacht was. The collision could have been avoided if the aft lights had been switched on and the master called to the bridge. The watchkeeper should also have been more familiar with the engine controls. When the watchkeeper first saw the Wainui, the sight of a green sidelight should have told her that the other vessel would continue out to her starboard side and probably pass clear. Her misinterpretation was the result of a lack of formal training and her impaired vision. Her perception that it was normal to pass other vessels port-to-port showed her ignorance of collision rules. When she became concerned, she should have alerted the skipper. The watchkeeper had also elected to allow her relief to continue sleeping below, and may have been more tired than she realised. Findings � Had neither vessel taken any action, the Toolka-T would probably have passed clear of both the Wainui and the Sea-Tow II. � Neither the deckhands nor Elliott took the opportunity to use the VHF radio, sound the whistle or switch on more lights. Such actions may have avoided the accident. � Neither deckhand was fully conversant with the contents of the Wainui's safe ship management manual. � Elliott had impaired vision, and should not have been a watchkeeper on the voyage. The accident highlighted the lack of good watchkeeping practice that exists on some commercial and pleasure vessels, said the commission, and indicates the need to 'Critically review the legislative requirements for watchkeepers in both marine fields.' Following the accident, the owners of the Wainui changed their training regime and established mandatory crew training records. The Toolka T's watchkeeper had gained a Boatmaster's certificate. The Maritime Safety Authority accepts both the TAIC's recommendations. Flooding could have been disastrous Severe storm-force sou'westerly winds of 35 knots gusting to 70 knots were recorded at Beacon Hill on Wellington Harbour at about 1750 hours on July 14, 2002, when the ro-ro vessel Kent passed by in-bound on her way to her berth at Glasgow Wharf. The 122.95m vessel was operated by Strait Shipping Ltd. On board were 16 crew under the command of a mate/master, and nine passengers. The stern entered the basin between Glasgow and Kings Wharves, and as the bow neared the outer end of Glasgow Wharf, the seamen on the fo'c'sle sent a heaving line ashore, followed by a headline. When the headline was secure the crew heaved it tight. The mate/master adjusted the engine controls to start moving the stern towards the wharf. The forward thrust of the engines and the helm being hard-to-port caused the ship to pivot about the mooring line. The shoulder of the Kent contacted the corner of the wharf, and the mooring line parted. The mate/master ordered the fo'c'sle crew to 'get another line out', but they were unable to secure another line. As the mate/master manoeuvred the vessel back out into the harbour to re-assess the situation, the Kent struck two pontoons moored off the end of Kings Wharf. A previously unknown underwater projection on the outer pontoon pierced and gashed a metre-long hole in the Kent's hull in way of the engine room, about 380mm below the waterline. The ship continued out into the harbour, and at 1901 hours anchored north of Point Jerningham. But the anchor dragged and the ship was driven northwards by the wind. Beacon Head was told that the ship was holed and the engine room was flooding (at a rate of about 14 tonnes per minute), but the pumps were coping. However, the pumps were unable to keep pace, and at 1909 hours they short-circuited and the ship lost all power. At about 1945, the duty pilot boarded the Kent, and in discussion with the master and the mate/master decided that the ship should be towed to the Overseas Passenger Terminal, where temporary repairs could be made and the engine room pumped out. The engine room continued to flood unchecked, and when water entered the control room the engineers closed the fire door, but because it was not watertight the room eventually also flooded. The crew found no evidence of flooding on the lower vehicle deck. At no time was a distress signal sent or the general alarm sounded. The passengers and non-essential crew had been mustered abaft the bridge, and the ship was in contact with the shore and Beacon Hill. They were aware that the ship was holed and making water, but not of the severity of the situation. The effect of the flooding on the buoyancy of the ship was not ascertained while the engine room was flooding, so no one knew whether the Kent would remain afloat Had the water level risen above the door sill between the engine room and the main deck, the flooding would have continued unchecked, but the additional height of the deckhead in the after end of the engine room prevented this from happening. Similarly, had the emergency hatch in the forepart of the engine room failed, water would have been free to flow onto the main deck, causing continuous flooding. However, had water found its way onto the main deck, the increase in weight would have rapidly reduced the ship's stability to the point where it would have sunk or capsized. The water level stopped rising at between 600mm and 1m below the sill of the door into the main vehicle deck because the ship reached equilibrium, ie, there was sufficient reserve buoyancy to support the weight of the ship, including the flooded engine room. In its report, the Transport Accident Investigation Commission said the mate/master was responsible for the safe and efficient navigation of the ship. 'This suggested, but did not explicitly state, that the mate/master was responsible for deciding whether or not to use a tug when berthing or unberthing.' The mate/master had decided he could berth without the use of a tug. The commission identified three safety issues: � identification of significant risk for shipboard operations � management of available personnel in order that tasks may be completed with minimum risk and maximum safety, and � the lack of a watertight division between the engine room and the main vehicle deck. Findings The commission found that the mate/master was directing the foredeck crew from the bridge, but they were not being supervised by an officer or other suitably experienced person who might have better appreciated the urgency of the situation and been able to get a replacement mooring line ashore quickly enough to prevent the ship from being blown towards Kings Wharf. The flooding had progressed until it reached a level equal to the draught of the ship. 'Had the ship been more deeply laden or further trimmed by the stern, or a combination of both, so that the sill was below the water level, the flooding would have continued and the consequences would have been catastrophic,' the commission said. By stopping the diesel engines and shutting down the alternators, the engineers had minimised long-term damage to the machinery. Two weeks after the accident, Strait Shipping issued a memorandum to its masters and mate/masters reiterating its policy that the use of tugs for berthing was at their discretion. The company also commissioned a naval architect to produce wind polar curves for all its vessels to show the maximum vessel thrust against wind-generated thrust for different wind directions. On December 6 the commission recommended that Strait Shipping: � Undertake a risk analysis of critical voyage events to identify areas of significant risk and counter-measures necessary to minimise the hazard to personnel, ship and harbour installations. � Ensure that crewing levels on all vessels are sufficient to enable the ship to be operated safely in all circumstances. Consideration should be given to the effective management of on and off-duty staff. � Investigate the watertight integrity of the ships with a view to enhancing their ability to withstand flooding damage. Consider upgrading the ship's stability data to enable the master to easily calculate the residual stability under varying conditions of service, including a damaged condition.
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